ABSTRACT The expansion of the smart devices, the growing popularity of the social networks, and the wide spread of the corporate services impose huge amounts of heterogeneous data to be generated and stored in separate silos on a daily basis. Parts of this data are private and highly sensitive as they reflect owner's behavior, obligations, habits, and preferences. On the other hand, the emerging crowd services challenge the owners to expose these data in return to the convenience they offer. Therefore, it is imperative not only to protect the interaction with sensitive data, but also to selectively open it in an unharmful manner for the owner's personal integrity. One of the main enablers of the crowd services is the emerging linked data, which is all about opening heterogeneous knowledge from separate data silos. Its growing popularity encourages the data owners to publish their personal data in linked data format. The fusion of sensor, social, and corporate data opens new security challenges, which extend the standard security considerations toward more flexible and context aware authorization platforms. In this paper, we propose a linked data authorization (LDA) platform atop a policy language flexible enough to cover all newly emerged requirements, including context awareness. The proposed policy language extends the widely accepted W3C's SPARQL query language and leverages its expressiveness to protect every part of the data. The novelty of our LDA platform is its unique capability of design time policy validation through stand-alone testing, conflict detection, and overall protection coverage extraction.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the smart world around us, billions of devices, users and applications continuously generate vast amount of heterogeneous data. These devices range from regular computers to mobile phones, wearables, and sensor nodes. Thanks to the Internet, they are connected to each other, enabling them to exchange and fuse data with the social media resources, which may be further integrated with the corporate databases. Such a data mixture provides situation awareness that empowers the applications and the human users to better understand their surrounding environment. Furthermore, combining multiple data sources can make the context aware applications capable of making intelligent decisions, regarding their environment changes. This fused data is continuously gathered and stored at various enterprise servers, cloud infrastructures or even on private storage servers.
The heterogeneity of the devices makes interoperability a challenging task because of the different nature of the generated data (temperature, light, video, text, location), the inconsistent quality, and the trustworthiness of the sources. In the past decades, the W3C recognized this problem and introduced new standards known as Web 3.0, or Semantic Web [1] . The main goal of these W3C standards is to move the World Wide Web towards the Web of Data, transforming the pages into linked data resources consumable by software agents. The Linked Data approach [2] , [3] provides new ways of integrating and consolidating data from various and distributed sources, solving the issue of isolated data silos such as the traditional relational database systems. This approach enables publishing and contextual linking of data on the Web of Data. An illustration of some of the entities that publish data in the Linked Open Data (LOD) Cloud [4] is shown in Fig. 1 . The LOD cloud 1 visualizes a subset of the datasets 2 published using the Linked Data principles [3] .
The data we generate, directly or through the devices we posses, combined with the general public knowledge (such as DBpedia [5] ) and the corporate databases can describe our habits, environment, and, in case of wearables, even our health. Since this data is of sensitive nature, it should remain private and protected. If not properly secured, it can cause serious privacy violation. Analysis of misuse of sensitive location data is shown in [6] , where the authors discuss that the advertising industry largely benefits from personal information exposed by improper data handling. Nevertheless, when the user data is handled properly, it can be used to provide crowd sourced services that can significantly improve our lives. Such an example is the Google Traffic service 3 that uses user's locations to detect congested routes and propose alternative faster routes. This service saves precious time of the users and favors the general community.
The need for personalized, user defined protection of vast amounts of heterogeneous data has not been considered before in such scale. The security protocols, procedures and tools are always a step behind in handling new security challenges. When it comes to sensitive data, no matter whether it is personal, social or corporate, strict rules must be applied to ensure that it is properly accessed and handled. The data owners' ability to control who and under what conditions gets accesses to their data can encourage them to expose beneficiary data for the greater goods, and at the same time, protect their privacy. Tools that enable security policy testing and preview of the protected data are important step towards gaining trust in the authorization platforms.
The data storage and management systems expose their data through various processing actions, submitted by a requester, who may be a person, software agent or any other subject that can send its intention to the system. A requester is identified by the evidences it presents to the system, such as its authentication token or other environmental parameters, usually provided by the software agent. These evidences, together with the system's state, define the context in which the action executes. When an action is invoked, its operations, parameters and context describe the processing intention, or Intent.
The security rules are typically expressed as natural language requirements. Although the free text requirements have great expressiveness, their diversity makes them almost impossible to implement. Therefore, the requirements need to be formalized and translated into machine readable security policies that are easier to implement. The policy formalism settles the boundaries of free text requirement transformation into security policies, i.e., rules that define which parts of the data can be protected in a given contextual environment. Furthermore, the policy language provides a syntax that supports this formalism and simplifies the management process. In the traditional enterprises, the translation process is usually carried out by properly trained security officers and administrators. However, the scale of the data to be protected, its creation velocity and its heterogeneity makes the centralized policy management unfeasible. Therefore, the policy formalism should support tools that will enable regular users to protect their own heterogeneous and distributed data.
The design time validation of the policies' correspondence to the security requirements is crucial for proper data protection. The correspondence can be validated only if the policy language enables extraction of the data protected by the policy. Additionally, every well designed policy language should enable detecting and resolving possible conflicts in the policies.
Since the W3C's Semantic Web initiatives have defined standards that enable linking of the resources stored in different datasets [1] , [7] , and the Linked Open Data initiative have defined mechanisms for matching the same resources with different representations [3] , one of the issues that remains open is the design of a policy language able to protect data stored or exposed as Linked Data [8] , [9] . This policy language should provide various levels of protection granularity over distributed datasets and flexibility to match the natural language requirements. Apart from the flexibility, the policy language should be easy to understand and learn, and it should enable creating tools that will simplify the policy management and validation.
The main motivation of this paper is to design a platform that protects every interaction with arbitrary parts of the Linked Data and supports design time policy correctness validation. The proposed Linked Data Authorization (LDA) platform fulfills this goal and is able to protect read, insert, delete and manage operations using its flexible policy language that links the protected data to the authorization environment. The policy language is based on the well established W3C standardized SPARQL syntax 4 which enables reuse of the existing knowledge and tools for policy management simplification. Additionally, we implemented a policy management module that enables design time validation of the data protected by the policies, conflict detection and overall protected and unprotected data extraction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in §II, the design principles of the LDA platforms used for comparison with the literature and assertion of our work are emphasized. Based on these platform design principles, §III provides literature overview and emphasizes the need for our LDA platform. In §IV, we describe the architecture of our LDA platform, together with the policy language description and enforcement implementation. In §V, the platform implementation is described, and use case is presented for better understanding. Afterwards, in §VI, we point out the strengths and weaknesses in respect to the defined design principles, together with performance evaluation of the implementation. Eventually, in §VII, we conclude our work.
II. LINKED DATA AUTHORIZATION DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Designing a complete authorization platform requires identifying security aspects for quality assessment. The expansion of Linked Data has motivated many researchers to work on security issues, either by restricting the set of available actions [10] - [12] or by filtering the data available for the operations [13] - [20] . In this section, we discuss the authorization aspects required for suitable protection not only of the data published using the Linked Data design principles, but also the data produced by various mobile devices and sensors, possibly stored in traditional database systems. Based on extensive literature review we have defined the following four design principles: (1) flexibility defines the need for covering wide range of requirements in the authorization system; (2) maintainability focuses on the policy management process optimization; (3) correctness validation emphasizes the importance of the policy testability, and (4) understandability settles the importance of using standardized syntax as basis of the policy language. Furthermore, we use these principles to analyze the related work in §III and lay the foundations of our policy language and authorization platform.
A. FLEXIBILITY
Flexibility is the ability to transform arbitrary free text authorization requirements into security policies. It defines the power of the policy language to express a range of different security requirements. According to [15] , a policy can be generally formalized using the tuple R, D, AR , which describes the access rights AR assigned to the requesters R (or Subject) for the data D (or resources). Regarding this policy formalization, there are different flexibility aspects that every modern LDA platform should meet:
1) OPERATION COVERAGE
This aspect defines the operations supported by the authorization platform, referred to as Permission Model in [21] .
In this paper, we use the term atomic operations (or operations for brevity) for the inseparable actions that can be executed, while the term action is used to denote a more complex processing (usually from the business domain) that requires one or more operations to be invoked. Throughout the literature, the operations read, insert (often referred to as create [21] or write [10] , [22] ) and delete are usually covered. Inspired by [15] , where the authors use the SPARQL query types as atomic operations for protection, in this paper, we additionally include the manage atomic operation, which unifies the named graph 5 creation, dropping, copying and moving interactions.
2) GRANULARITY
The Linked Data follows a directed graph structure where the nodes are represented by resources and literals, and the edges are represented by properties of the resources. The resources are used to describe real world or abstract concepts, and the literals represent primitive values that can be assigned as a property value for a resource. Every pair of connected nodes, including the property that connects them (edge), is referred to as triple, which can logically belong to a named graph and be physically stored in a dataset [1] , [2] . The granularity aspect defines the ability of the policy language to capture the data structure and semantics at a various levels. The granularity level is determined through the ability to protect resources, triples, named graphs and datasets and is one of the most commonly discussed aspect in other authorization platforms [23] . In our work, we use the following features that enable various granularity levels for protection:
• Triple Patterns (TP) are essentially triples that can have variable at any position, used for selection of resources that have certain property or connection with other resource. The TP selection results with a set of triples.
• Basic Graph Patterns (BGP) are set of triple patterns that can capture more complex relationships among the resources.
• Graph membership (Gm) enables selection of triples that belong to a given named graph.
• Dataset membership (DSm) enables selection of triples that belong to a given dataset.
3) CONTEXT AWARENESS
The growing popularity and presence of sensing devices for ubiquitous computing make the context inevitable part of the modern systems. In order to provide suitable protection of the private and sensitive data they produce, a flexible authorization framework must take the context into account [11] , [13] , [21] . Nevertheless, the data context may infer an emergency situation that requires exposure of sensitive data to corresponding authorities so they can react appropriately. For example, a person wearing a heart-rate sensor may want to keep his/her measurements private until an emergency situation occurs. In such situations, the data needs to be opened to the doctor in order to react properly. Therefore, the authorization platform must provide both protection and exposure of the data, based on the context.
4) CONTEXT-DATA-REQUESTER ASSOCIATION
The authorization requirements may define protected data D in respect to the requester [20] , [24] , [25] and its environment [11] , [13] . Therefore, the policy language must link the requester's properties, the guarded data and the contextual evidences.
5) AGGREGATED DATA SHARING
Crowd source applications provide many convenient services to the users in return to sharing of anonymized and aggregated sensitive data. Consequently, the authorization platforms should enable exposure of portions of the protected data based on user's choice.
6) CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Since most of the authorization platforms support multiple allow or deny policies, a conflict may arise when one policy allows and other denies interaction with the same portion of data for a given requester. Conflict resolution mechanisms [11] , [15] , [16] , [24] are crucial for consistent data protection, giving the data owner possibility to choose which part of the conflicting data should be allowed.
B. MAINTAINABILITY
The maintainability is determined by the time it takes to transform the security requirements into policies. Mechanisms that support policy management can simplify this process and can provide more accurate protection [23] , [26] .
1) CONFLICT DETECTION
The conflicts are not always obvious and they may remain undetected for a long period of time [26] , [27] . Therefore, a conflict detection mechanism should be provided in order to detect the conflicts at the very policy creation phase, preventing inappropriate data protection.
2) PROTECTED DATA COVERAGE
The data protected by each policy, along with the overall protected an unprotected data are very important for accurate data protection [30] . In an authorization platform that offers data coverage preview, the data owner is aware of the data portions that are unprotected and can react by specifying additional policies as needed. Lack of this kind of information may lead to ambiguities and exposure of protected data.
C. CORRECTNESS VALIDATION
The policy testing is a challenging task since the requesters and the context introduce high-dimensional space that is hard to be covered and understood. In order to ensure correctness during design time, it is necessary to validate that the policy corresponds to the requirement it represents [30] . Therefore, the authorization platform must enable mechanisms that will provide a preview of the data protected by the policy, so that the data owner can check if this data corresponds to the requirement.
D. UNDERSTANDABILITY
Understandability can be observed as the time it takes to master the policy format and language of the authorization platform [23] , [31] . Hence, using a standardized policy language supported by a larger community can significantly reduce the learning time and make the language more understandable.
III. RELATED WORK
In order to review the related work in respect to the authorization principles in §II, we created Table 1 , which summarizes and compares the most relevant Linked Data authorization approaches that support data protection. The column Operation represents the operation coverage and shows that the read operation protection is the most popular. However, the policy languages that support Insert and Delete operations [10] , [15] , [21] , [22] , [25] lack flexibility for data selection with complex graph patterns with exception of the policy language in [25] , where the authors just mention these operations without any explanation how they are enforced. The manage operation is only supported in [15] . In [11] , the policies protect the actions as a whole using ontology defined activation context.
The column group Granularity covers the corresponding flexibility aspect in respect to the requesters environment (column group Requester) and the data being protected (column group Protected data). The ability to use triple patterns for the Requester and Protected Data is shown in the columns TP. The columns BGP show whether the data or the requester can be selected through basic graph patterns. In the columns Gm and DSm, the capability for representing graph and dataset membership is shown, correspondingly. In [10] , [15] , [17] , and [18] , the requester is specified by its Internationalized Resource Identifier (IRI), 6 by its class in [10] , [15] , and [29] , and by its role attribute in [19] and [29] . The SPARQL query language used in [21] and [22] enables policy activation based on the requester's graph membership. When it comes to defining the protected data, the policy language from [25] offers best flexibility through the SPARQL expressiveness, followed by the policies that use SWRL [24] or equivalent syntax [13] , [20] . However, these policies are limited regarding the graph membership.
The column Context describes whether the approach covers the context awareness considerations. Although the context is part of the policies in [13] , the authors do not provide detailed explanation of the available evidences used to build it. The Schi3ld framework [21] uses static context represented with the prissma ontology, 7 while [11] uses dynamic context definition for evidence description.
The columns grouped as Association show whether it is possible to combine the context with the requester (column CR) or with the data (column CD), and whether the approach supports combination of the requester's properties with the data (column RD). This group of columns represents the context-data-requester association consideration. Only [11] and [13] are able to link all properties and evidences together. The Proteus framework [11] activates the context based on description logic and logical programming rules, which links the requester to the data and the context. The work in [13] uses the Protune policy language [32] to define policies that implicate an allowed or denied triple based on a basic graph pattern matching. In [24] and [25] , the policies are defined in the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) [33] , which enables combining the requester's properties with the data. A policy format with similar expressiveness to SWRL is employed in [20] . The work in [21] links the static context information with the requester's properties through a SPARQL query [34] , [35] assigned to the activation policy's property. The policy languages that do not link the requesters' properties to the data usually have policy activation phase [10] , [15] , [17] , [21] , [22] , which depends on the requester and the action it intends to execute. This activation phase selects the applicable policies that are later enforced. The enforcement phase can filter only the permitted data [13] , [15] - [18] , [20] , [21] , [24] , [25] , or it can allow or deny the requested action as a whole [10] , [11] .
The rest of the authorization principles are only marginally covered in the reviewed literature, and therefore, they are omitted in Table 1 . The conflict resolution consideration is considered only in [13] , [16] , and [21] . All these approaches are using strategy for conflict resolution where the deny policies have higher precedence than the allowing one, or vice versa. However, the default strategy does not provide conflict resolution flexibility since the policy administrator cannot specify precedence of the policies. Custom algorithms for conflict resolution [15] partially solve this problem, but they are complex and require extensive testing and validation. The policy priorities [11] , [36] provide the most flexible way of conflict resolution and are closest to the way people resolve conflicts.
The conflict detection is also required to detect requirement anomalies and to resolve them before a damage is made. Rules for policy anomaly detection able to detect contradiction or conflict are defined in [19] , but their policy language lacks flexibility and the policy correspondence to the requirement is not considered. Similarly, in [31] , a safety and consistency of the policies is considered through their interactions. Regarding protected data coverage, Flouris et al. [16] and Oulmakhzoune et al. [18] consider conflicts and policy data coverage, but they only discuss the default protection mechanisms for the guarded data and do not present this information during the policy maintenance.
Besides the flexibility, the correctness of the policies is rarely considered in the reviewed platforms. A methodology for implementation correctness validation of query rewriting authorization frameworks is proposed in [15] , but it is not suitable for design time policy validation against the requirements. The policy language should enable designing tools that provide policy testing so that one can validate whether they meet the requirements they are designed for.
The main challenge that remains open is providing a design time validation of the policy correctness, while enabling flexibility to represent the natural language requirements. In this direction, the system presented in [13] uses the most complete policy language -Protune [32] . However, this system protects only the read operations and is unable to protect the data graph and dataset memberships. The authors do not discuss conflict detection and resolution. Only Kirrane [15] validates the implementation correctness of their authorization system, but they do not provide design time testability and correctness validation. In emergency situations, context awareness is of crucial importance for the data owner. In such scenarios, emergency policies should override the default system behavior and expose the sensitive private information to the VOLUME 6, 2018 parties that can help the data owner. Moreover, exposing aggregated information that hides the sensitive personal information can enable emerging of new and more advanced crowd sourced services that will improve the quality of life in general. To the best of our knowledge, there is no policy language that provides this kind of protection. Our work aims to fill in the gaps of the existing approaches by proposing a flexible and complete LDA platform that covers all settled design principles in §II.
IV. LDA PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE
The goal of the LDA platform is to enforce the clients' security requirements represented in the platform as policies. The architecture of the LDA platform is shown in Fig. 2 . The LDA platform protects the guarded data D (Definition 2) by enforcing the protection requirements represented by the security policies (Definition 5). The Intent (Definition 3) describes the action that the requester is attempting to execute, which, at some point, should interact with the guarded data D. One of the central components of the platform is the IntentProvider component that we designed to extract the Intent I from the available evidences in the platform (usually describing the requester, environment and action). This component provides context awareness by embedding dynamic context evidences in the Intent I. Additionally, the IntentProvider is tightly coupled with the authentication process and it extracts the evidences presented after the requester is authenticated. The idea of the Intent component is based on our analysis on various distributed multiprocessing platforms that store and generate much of the todays data, especially the Android operating system Intent 8 component. The Android's Intent concept provides a flexible way of expressing both user intention and its environment, so we adopted this data structure in order to represent the requester's intention in the Linked Data management platforms. In the LDA platform, the Intent I is implemented as a set of RDF triples that describes the context in which the intended action executes, including the operation, the action parameters, the requester with its environmental evidences and the event that invoked the action. Additionally, the term intent is preferred because it represents the implicit user intention, but it is uncertain whether it will be permitted, denied or partially executed.
The enforcement module executes the algorithms that ensure the authorized interaction with the underlaying data. We defined separate enforcement algorithm for each operation, where the operation is executed against previously constructed allowed data (Definition 4) for the intent. The policies used to construct the allowed data are selected based on the requested operation and Intent I. In the LDA platform, the allowed data is stored in temporal dataset. Unlike the approaches in [16] , [24] , and [25] , which create a ''protected graph'', we create temporal dataset in order to preserve the structural organization of the data without loosing any information. Once the enforcement module finishes processing and filtering of the data, the allowed data (if any) is transfered to the ResultInterpreter component, which transforms the results in the requested form based on the Intent I. The ResultInterpreter additionally inserts the activated policies as an explanation of the result. When the operation is denied as a whole, the enforcement module throws an exception, which is serialized by the ResultInterpreter.
The enforcement module behavior and the legitimate protection depend on the policy correctness. The policy man-agement module supports the design time policy correctness validation and provides conflict detection, standalone policy testing, policy protection per intent, and overall protected and unprotected data extraction. This module is valuable tool for the data owners and simplifies the policy maintenance process.
In order to support maintainability and correctness validation, we make an effort to formally define the LDA platform and policy language. The formal definitions enable the design of the transformation algorithms for standalone policy testing, conflict detection and protected/unprotected data extraction, all used in the policy management module.
Definition 1: Linked data authorization (LDA) platform is represented by the tuple D, I, P , where D is the guarded data, I is the requester's Intent and P is the set of the policies defined in the platform.
Definition 2: Guarded data (D) is a set of tuples S, P, O, G, DS that defines the RDF triples S, P, O ∈
(I ∪ B) × (I ∪ B) × (I ∪ B ∪ L)
logically organized in graphs G, physically stored in datasets DS. I , B and L represent the sets of all Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRI), blank nodes and literals, respectively. Definition 3: Intent (I) is a semantic representation of the requester's intention, composed of multiple RDF triples. Definition 4: Allowed data is the largest subset of the guarded data D that is permitted for the intent I by the policies P.

A. POLICY LANGUAGE
A policy (Definition 5) specifies the affected data after the intended action is executed. The intended action may involve multiple operations that should be constrained by the policy. READ operation policies define the data that can be obtained from the guarded data D, while the modification operation policies (INSERT and DELETE) define the allowed state of the guarded data D after the operation is executed. MANAGE operation policies describe whether the operation should be allowed or not. In this way, the policies are easier to comprehend, define and validate against the requirements. Depending on the operation, the activated policies define whether the action will be rejected, allowed or it will have restricted access to the allowed data. • o ∈ {READ, INSERT , DELETE, MANAGE} is the intended operation
• q is a tuple of four variables used to project the extracted variable bindings into protected data quads 9 D (I,p) .
• ϕ i and ϕ d are predicate functions used for variable extraction from the Intent I and the guarded data D.
• ρ is a priority used for conflict resolution. 9 Quad is essentially a triple with additional element that denotes the graph in which it belongs. It is a four element tuple.
Definition 6: Predicate function ϕ(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is an n-ary function that returns true if the terms t i ∈ T = I ∪B∪L ∪{nil} satisfies its predicates, where n = |vars(ϕ)|. vars(ϕ) extracts the set of variables defined in the predicate function ϕ, while vars(ϕ, i) returns the variable expected as i-th argument in the ϕ function.
The protected data by a single policy depends on the Intent I and is a subset of the guarded data D. Definition 7 describes how this data is obtained for a given policy p and Intent I.
Definition 7: Policy protected data D (I,p) for Intent I and 
ρ is a set of quads obtained as a result of the expression:
According to Definition 7 and Definition 8, the protected data is obtained by first extracting the set of tuples (t 1 , . . . , t m ) from the Intent I that satisfy the conditions in ϕ i , the set of tuples (t m+1 , . . . , t m+n ) from the guarded data D that satisfy the conditions in ϕ d , and then joins them based on the expression vars(ϕ 1 , i) = vars(ϕ 2 , j) ⇒ t i = t j . Next, the projection π from Definition 9 reduces these results to fourelement tuples that correspond to the variables of interest in q. An example that illustrates this formalism on a real case sample data is shown in §V.
1) POLICY COMBINATION
In every non-trivial system, there are multiple requirements represented by policies. In such case, it is possible that multiple policies are activated for the same Intent, and hence, their protected data needs to be combined.
The operator determines how the data from two policies is combined. When two policies have the same permission, their protected data is combined together with the union VOLUME 6, 2018 operator ∪, preserving the permission. In the opposite case, the protected data by the second policy is removed from the protected data by the first policy using the set minus operator \, keeping the permission of the first policy. 
Definition 11: Allowed data extraction function α(I, D, P) is a function that outputs the subset of the guarded data D that is allowed for a particular Intent I, using the LDA platform configured policies P, such that:
states that the allowed data function α extracts all the data from the guarded data D that is available for a given Intent I and allowed by the entire set of LDA platform configured policies P. The policy's protected data D (I,p) , on the contrary, contains only the quads that are allowed or denied by a single policy for a given Intent I. The function α actually combines the protected data of every policy using the operator, considering the policy priorities ρ. The α = α (k) equation denotes that the allowed data for the Intent I will be the result obtained after the highest priority policy p k is applied. The
Since the operator always takes the permission from its first argument, α (0) is used to force the allowed data as result of α (1) , while
is used to propagate this permission to the final result. For example, if the lowest priority policy p 1 allows access, α (1) = + , ∅ ∪ D (I,p 1 ) = + , D (I,p 1 ) , i.e., nothing is allowed at the beginning, and the allowed data is extended with the next policy. In the opposite case, when p 1 denies access, α (1) = − , D \ D (I,p 1 ) , i.e., everything is allowed at the beginning, and the allowed data is reduced by the next policy.
2) POLICY LANGUAGE SYNTAX
The role of a policy language is to provide a syntax that will support the policy formalism. The policy language should be designed to correspond to the policy formalism, while simplifying the requirement transformation into policies. Our Listing 1. Policy language definition with first order logic using prologue syntax.
policy language extends the SPARQL syntax for policy definition. The SPARQL extension is used in order to make the policies more readable and understandable, without mixing more syntaxes, which is the case in [21] , [22] , and [25] . The large amount of SPARQL resources makes the core of our policy language easier to understand and learn. The additional parts introduced in our policy language, on the top of SPARQL syntax, are the permission, operation, priority and the dataset elements, which are simple and do not introduce much complexity.
The first order logic definition of the SPARQL extension in our language 10 is shown in Listing 1. The permission element defines whether the policy allows or denies the operation and corresponds to the element of the policy formalism in Definition 5. The operation element is composed of one of the operation keywords opKeyword that defines the operation o, optionally followed by a quad pattern that specifies the projection variables q. Although our formalism does not explicitly support MODIFY operations, in order to provide better maintainability, we added this operation in our language for convenience. Nevertheless, the MODIFY operation policies are formally represented by separate INSERT and DELETE operation policies.
Our policy language takes advantage of the SPARQL expressiveness for data selection which is used to specify the policy protected data D (I,p) in Definition 5. The policy language selection part is a valid SPARQL element that outputs variable bindings and corresponds to the σ (ϕ i , I, ϕ d , D) function. The predicate function ϕ i is specified as SPARQL GRAPH element, 11 while ϕ d is specified as SPARQL group 10 The reused parts from the original SPARQL specification are referenced by their URL. The <#something> elements from the definition should be replaced with <https://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-query/#something>.
11 https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-sparql-query/#rGraphGraphPattern graph pattern. 12 They are both used to extract variable bindings: the former from the implicitly managed named graph that represents the Intent I, while the later, from the dataset against which the query is executed D. The policy language quad pattern defines the four variables of interest from the solutions obtained by the σ function. The LDA platform uses these solutions to construct a set of quads that will represent the protected data quads D (I,p) . In this way, the administrators can specify an arbitrary resource, triple, quad or graph that should be protected and test the selection against their guarded data D.
The priority element is used for conflict resolution. We use this approach since it is closest to the way people resolve the conflicts in the requirements. They either add another meta-policy that has higher priority compared to the others, or just tell that one of the requirement is more important than the others. Both cases can be modeled with policy priorities where the policies with higher priority are overriding the results of those with lower priority.
One of the key features of the semantic data is its interoperability and re-usability. In order to follow this trend, our policy language is capable of defining policies that can protect multiple datasets through the datasets element. This feature encourages distributed data storage and enables definition of policies that will protect this data. The datasets are represented by their dereferencable IRI, which is a downside from a maintainability point of view because all IRIs should be manually provided. The absence of this element means that the policy applies to all datasets.
B. ENFORCEMENT MODULE
The goal of the Enforcement module is to ensure interaction only with the allowed data for a given intent. It uses partial data filtering strategy [23] and generates temporal dataset against which executes the operation. The operation determines the behavior of the Enforcement module. When read operation is executed, the results are either filtered or conditionally returned. Insertion of new data and removal of existing data requires validation if the data is allowed for the given Intent. The allowed data extracted with the function α is always constructed from the policies that protect the given operation.
Depending on the Intent and the data sensitivity, the operations may be executed against the allowed data extracted with the function α from Definition 11 or they can be allowed or denied conditionally. Based on the action's configuration, in the process of conversion of available evidences into an Intent I, the IntentProvider embeds the information weather partial results are allowed or not. When partial results are not allowed, the LDA platform throws an exception when some part of the requested data is denied, i.e., it conditionally rejects the requested data without filtering it. 12 https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-sparql-query/#rGroupGraphPattern
1) POLICY ALIGNMENT
The policies defined in the LDA platform can use arbitrary variable names. The LDA platform aligns the policies by unifying the variable names that refer to the same resources, which is useful in the processes of policy combination, conflict detection and overall data coverage estimation. The policy alignment starts by renaming all variables in the policies with globally unique variable names. Then, the policies' quad patterns q are aligned, providing that the same variables are used for the protected quads. We use the quad pattern q 0 = (?s
Next, the triple patters from the predicate functions ϕ i are aligned against each other. The variables that occur at the same position in the quad patterns that are ''equivalent'' are aligned by replacing the corresponding variables. The equivalent quad patterns are either the same or differ only in the variable names at the corresponding triple's positions.
This step is executed for each pair of policies, starting from the policies with the lowest priority.
2) ALLOWED DATA EXTRACTION
In the LDA platform, the allowed data is stored in temporal dataset since it is composed of multiple quads returned by the policies' protected data D (I,p) . Thus, we achieve execution of the requested queries in their native form, without modification. In the cases when a ''temporal graph'' is used [16] , [24] , [25] , the queries containing GRAPH element should be transformed in order to obtain the permitted results, usually by removing the GRAPH elements in the query. This query modification looses information and often may produce incorrect results.
Algorithm 1 describes the implementation of the allowed data extraction function α from Definition 11 and the creation of the temporal dataset DS tmp . The policies in P are aligned as described in §IV-B1 and sorted by their priority in ascending order. Since the SPARQL query language supports combining the elements using UNION and MINUS operations, the allowed data α is constructed with a single query.
According to Algorithm 1, the Intent is first registered (line 1) by inserting the Intent's data I in a newly created named graph <http://intent/{id}>, where the {id} is sequentially generated in order to enable concurrent Intent processing. The registerIntent(I, D, P) additionally replaces the <http://intent> string with the newly created graph name in every policy from P and returns a set of modified policies P . Next, the SPARQL's WHERE expression W is initialized depending on the lowest priority policy permission p 1 .permission. The initialization of α 0 from Definition 11 (lines 2-5) uses the quad pattern ϕ 0 = { ?s ?p ?o ?g }, which matches every quad from the guarded data D, and ϕ ∅ , which is an empty predicate function that has no variables and does not select any data. Afterwards, all policies from P are VOLUME 6, 2018 processed (lines 6-11). When a policy has allow permission, the content of its WHERE element 13 is appended using the UNION operation (line 8). In the opposite case, the MINUS operation is used (line 10). After all policies from P are processed, the resulting WHERE element is executed against the guarded data D to extract the variable mappings (line 12). The extracted variable mappings for q 0 are transformed into quads in order to form the resulting temporal dataset DS tmp (line 13).
After the temporal dataset is created, all operations are executed against it. Since this dataset contains only the allowed data, it provides implicit security, meaning that the queries do not interact with the data which is not allowed.
3) READ OPERATION PROTECTION
The READ operation is used to extract data of interest that satisfies certain criteria, specified by a query Q(D) that can be executed against multiple datasets D. However, when requester authorization is required, the read operation additionally depends on the Intent I and on the configured policies P in order to determine the allowed data.
Definition 12 formalizes the outcome of the read operations, showing that the allowed data for the query should be obtained by its execution against the allowed data. The conditional equation in Definition 12 refers to the scenario where no data filtering is involved. This protection may be required when result consistency is needed. In this case, the read operation is allowed only if the protected results R(I, Q) are the same as the query results executed against the original data.
Definition 12 (Read Protection):
This approach allows implicit protection even when the requester is aware of the data structure and is able to execute multiple probing queries with malicious intention. The correctness of Definition 12 is confirmed in [15] , where the allowed data is used as baseline for proving that a query rewriting algorithm is secure.
Our LDA platform executes each query against the temporal dataset that represents the allowed data for reading α read , which is constructed using only the policies with read operation.
4) DELETE OPERATION PROTECTION
The delete operation usually requests a set of quads to be deleted from the existing data, defined directly or with a query that selects the quads for removal. As Definition 13 shows, only the permitted data should be deleted in the partial deletion scenario. Since the data is already present in the dataset, the allowed data function α delete will return the existing quads that are allowed for removing, and the intersection with the requested one gives what can be deleted after the enforcement process. When the data consistency should be preserved, which is the most often case, all requested data must be permitted.
Definition 13 (Delete Protection): a) partial: D(I, q d
For each delete operation, our LDA platform checks if the quads are present in the temporal dataset constructed from the delete operation policies. If partial removal is allowed, only the quads that are found in this dataset are removed. In cases when SPARQL query is used to define the data that should be removed, this query is first executed against the permitted dataset for the read operations, and the resulting quads are filtered in the permitted dataset for deletion.
5) INSERT OPERATION PROTECTION
The INSERT operations usually modify the state of the dataset and receive a set of quads to be created (d i ) in addition to the Intent. Since most of the platforms have some consistency assumptions, the conditional protection will be the most common way of inserting data, where all the quads requested for creation should be approved. Such an example are the relational databases that constrain the data with their model. However, there also exist platforms with looser constrains that may allow partial data entry. In this case, the partial data allowed for insertion is I (I, q i ) from Definition 14.
Definition 14 (Insert Protection): a) partial: I (I, q i
Since the policies describe the final state of the dataset after the interaction is executed, the permitted data function α insert selects the allowed consequences of the insert operation. This data is used to select which of the requested quads for insertion are allowed with I (I, q c ). When data consistency is required, the conditional equation in Definition 14 shows that the operation will be allowed only when all requested quads are permitted for insertion.
Our LDA platform first inserts the requested quads for creation q i in the original dataset, and then, constructs the allowed data for insertion. Next, every quad from q i that is not present in the allowed dataset for insertion is removed from the original dataset. The entire process is executed in a single transaction.
6) MANAGE OPERATION PROTECTION
The atomic managing operations are interacting with graph arguments embedded in the Intent as operation parameters. Partially allowing this kind of operations is impossible since they often require graph creation, deletion, coping or moving, which are either allowed or denied. The policies are processed starting from the highest priority towards the lowest. The permission of the first policy (which is with highest priority) that will return result is considered as final. The query executed for each policy is constructed with the transformation T ask (shown in Listing 3) and it returns whether the policy should be activated or not. Since the business actions are also described through the Intent, the same procedure is used for their protection.
C. AUTHORIZATION PRINCIPLES SUPPORT IN THE LDA PLATFORM
The LDA platform is designed to support all authorization design principles defined in §II. Table 2 summarizes the components and features that support the Flexibility, Maintainability, Correctness validation and Understandability principles. The policy language is designed to cover all flexibility aspects discussed in §II. In order to increase the understandability, our policy language is based on the W3C standardized SPARQL language, and hence, the policies can be easily transformed into SPARQL queries that can be executed against the guarded data D, which simplifies their maintainability. The IntentProvider component provides dynamic context representation, which is important part of the flexibility principle. The Enforcement module uses temporal datasets which ensures correct protection [15] and provides implicit security. The policy transformation algorithms denoted as Policy to SPARQL, Policy coverage, Minimal Intent Binding, Conflict detection and Protected/Unprotected data are employed in the Policy management module and can be executed in design phase. They simplify the maintenance process and can be used to validate that the guarded data is properly protected.
1) POLICY TO SPARQL
With this transformation algorithm, each policy becomes a regular SPARQL query that can be executed for a given Intent I. The resulting queries are used in the Enforcement Module during the guarded data protection. Additionally, these queries enable performing automated pol- icy tests through standalone policy testing.
The transformation in Listing 2 applies to the READ, INSERT, DELETE and MODIFY operation policies, while the transformation in Listing 3 applies to the MANAGE operation policies. With the first transformation, T select , the policy becomes a regular SPARQL SELECT query that first extracts the variable bindings from the Intent graph that meet the ϕ i conditions, and then, joins them with the solutions for ϕ d . The variable of interest are returned with the SELECT q part. We rely on the SPARQL's algebra [37] , which is similar to the relational algebra [38] , as an implementation for the variable extraction σ and the projection function π.
Similarly, the transformation T ask shows how the MANAGE operation policies can be transformed into SPARQL ASK queries that answers whether there is matching data for the selection conditions.
2) POLICY COVERAGE
When the data owner is interested in the overall data protected by a policy, no mater what the Intent is, it can use the query in Listing 4 to determine its coverage. The policy coverage is independent on the Intent and returns a subset from the guarded data D that satisfies the variable predicate function ϕ d . Formally, the policy coverage can be represented as
, where ϕ ∅ is an empty predicate function that has no variables (vars(ϕ ∅ ) = ∅) and always evaluates to true.
This transformation is very important for the policy design process since it provides a preview of the data covered by the policy and enables the policy designer to validate if all the data of interest is included.
3) MINIMAL INTENT BINDING EXTRACTION
Constructing an Intent that will activate the policy is a straight forward task because, if each variable from the policy's ϕ i element is replaced by an arbitrary resource, the resulting triples will form an Intent that will activate the policy. However, this Intent does not guarantee that the policy will protect any data D (I,p) , so we have to carefully choose the resources. Finding an Intent that will result in non-empty protected data D (I,p) may require writing of many additional queries. Therefore, the goal of Minimal Intent Binding extraction is to find all the Intents that result in non-empty protected data D (I,p) = ∅. This transformation algorithm is the base of conflict detection and protected data per minimal intent extraction algorithms.
Definition 15: Minimal intent binding extracts the variable mappings that satisfy only the guarded data predicate function ϕ d and selects only the variables that occur in both predicate functions (ϕ i and ϕ d ):
The Minimal Intent Binding extracts only the variables from ϕ i that influence the protected data extraction, i.e., the variables that occur both in ϕ i and ϕ d . The variables that occur only in the predicate function ϕ i are not considered because they only contribute to policy activation, but do not constrain the protected data D (I,p) . Therefore, we use the empty predicate function ϕ ∅ so that σ extracts only the solutions that satisfy 
4) CONFLICT DETECTION
When allow and deny permissions are allowed in the policies, conflicts may occur. Conflict detection in design phase is not a trivial task since the policy's protected data D (I (c) ,p) depends on the conflicting Intent I (c) , the content of which is not known in advance. Therefore, the conflict detection process should find the conflicting Intents I (c) for which there are two policies with opposite permission that protect the same data. The output of the conflict detection process must be comprehensive in order to provide simpler conflict resolution. Definition 16 shows that two policy are in conflict when they have opposite permissions and protect the same data. = ∅. Definition 17 shows that the conflict detection process should be able to extract the Minimal Intent Bindings for which the conflict occurs and to output them together with the conflicting data. In this way, the data owners can react in the design phase to prevent unwanted consequences through the conflict resolution process. 
= ∅. When two policies are in conflict, Definition 16 implies that there should exist a conflicting Intent I (c) that will activate them both i.e. I (c) satisfies both ϕ i1 and ϕ i2 , which leads to σ (ϕ i1 , I (c) , ϕ i2 , I (c) ) = ∅. The variables extracted by the previous expression are vars(ϕ i2 ) ∪ vars(ϕ i2 ). Since the D, ϕ d2 , D) ). The grouping gathers together the conflicting data D (c) for the same conflicting Minimal Intent Binding I (c) .
5) PROTECTED/UNPROTECTED DATA
In §IV-C2, we showed a transformation that obtains the data covered by the policy. This transformation can be generalized to obtain the overall protected and unprotected data in the platform. Listing 8 shows a query that returns the overall protected data in the platform. All aligned policies p i ∈ P (i ∈ [1..k], k = |P|) are combined together using the SPARQL UNION element.
A query that obtains overall unprotected data is shown in Listing 9, where ϕ q 0 is a predicate function that uses the variables from q 0 in order to denote the selection of every quad from the guarded data D. This query removes the protected data selected in Listing 8 from the guarded data D using the SPARQL's MINUS element. The result of this query represents an important tool for validation of the authorization completeness -when there is unprotected data, the data owners will be alerted in the very policy design phase.
V. PLATFORM IMPLEMENTATION AND VALIDATION
In order to validate the implementation of the LDA platform, we developed a fully functional prototype implementation. Additionally, we developed secured query execution query against the LDA platform guarded data in a user configurable context. The Context button in Figure 4 opens a modal window, where the user specifies the context evidences in Resource Description Format (RDF) format. 15 The data from the console is sent to the IntentProvider component that parses this data, creates an Intent and sends the Intent to the enforcement module, which ensures interaction with the allowed data only. In case of a read query, the Results Interpreter serializes the allowed results and sends them back to the user. Additionally, in order to support and simplify the policy administration, we developed a user interface that exposes the functionalities of the policy management module (Figure 6 ).
A. TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
The main challenge of the LDA platform is the design of an extendable and modular architecture independent on the authentication mechanism, capable of flexible authorization and security policy management. In order to meet the modularity requirement, the LDA platform utilizes the Spring Framework, as shown in Figure 5 . All semantic operations are implemented using the Apache Jena Library [39] , which is mainly used in the authorization enforcement and policy management processes.
The second layer in Figure 5 displays the modules that support the enforcement module which runs the authorization algorithms. The Intent provider module has a key role in the context aware authorization. The current implementation of the Intent provider module relies on the state of the art Spring Security [40] library which provides multiple authentication mechanisms. The current IntentProvider implementation uses the WebID authentication protocol [41] , [42] . However, due to the configurability that the Spring Security library provides, the IntentProvider component can be easily modified to use another AuthenticationProvider and to extract the Intent based on other authentication protocol, such as OAuth protocol, 16 X509 certificates, 17 Basic Authen- 15 https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf11-concepts/ 16 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749 17 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 tication 18 and many others. The policy management module enables the maintenance process and correctness validation. The PolicyProvider returns the policies based on the operation being executed and the dataset it is intended for. The PolicyTransformationService is used to extract the parts of the policies using the Jena API and it implements the transformation algorithms described in §IV-C. The result interpreter module serializes the results in the requested format and appends the query used to create the temporal graph as an explanation. Figure 5 also shows that the enforcement module exposes the AuthorizationProcessor interface, which accepts the submitted query that should be protected, the Intent, the dataset against which the query should be executed and an implementation of the ResultInterpreter interface. The AbstractAuthorizationProcessor first inserts the Intent in the dataset as a separate named graph, than delegates the execution to the specific operation implementation, and eventually, removes the named graph for Intent. Since the Dataset implementations in Jena provide transactions, this process is executed in a single transaction. All operation implementations constructs in-memory temporal dataset, but this behavior can be changed with different DatasetProvider implementation. 18 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617 
B. PLATFORM USE-CASE VALIDATION
In order to explain all details regarding LDA platform implementation and its capabilities, we designed a use case scenario that covers all important aspects of the LDA platform operation. Figure 7 shows a sample guarded data D that represents the popular mixing of data from smart devices with social and corporate data. It visualizes sensor observations that are fused with the users' personal data and with VOLUME 6, 2018 a patient management system's data. Figure 8 shows the ontology that models the classes and the properties of the data in Figure 7 . Our example covers one hospital, ex:hospital, with a sm:network_address ''194.168 .100.0/24'', located at the location _:l1, described with the Geo-names ontology. 19 Although, the ontology in Figure 8 shows that the hospitals may provide multiple applications for sensor synchronization, ex:hospital provides only the application ex:ssa. The application ex:ssa is fed by sensor data from the sensors ex:s1 and ex:s2 owned by its users ex:bob and ex:alice, respectively. These users are hospital's patients with treatments ex:t1 and ex:t2 conducted by the doctors ex:john and ex:ben, respectively. The treatment ex:t3 shows that ex:john is a patient of ex:ben. The fact that ex:john is a doctor and patient depending on the occasion, enables modeling different levels of separation of duty, as discussed in [43] . The locations _:l1 and _:l2, and the hospital's network IP address enable defining geo-spatial contextual requirements, while the duration of the treatments provides temporal contextual requirements. Figure 9 shows an example Intent _:i, where a requester ex:john tries to create a graph ex:ssa using a software agent _:ag through an intended action _:act. The SPIN ontology 20 models the SPARQL syntax and is used to represent the action in this example. It describes that the intended action is a SPARQL CREATE query (sp:Create) and the property sp:graphIRI represents the graph intended for creation. The int: prefix models the classes and the properties used to indicate the expected data structure for the Intent. The int:requester property and the class int:Requester specify who the requester is. The resource _:ag represents the software agent used to interact with the LDA platform.
1) POLICY's PROTECTED DATA D (I,p)
Listing 10 shows an example policy that allows the doctors to access their patients' observations from the hospital network only. In this example, the body of the GRAPH <http://intent> element (lines 5-8) corresponds to the predicate function ϕ i that validates the policy applicability for the Intent. In our case, we are using separate graph for maintaining the Intent's data. The policy utilizes the GRAPH <http://intent> element (line 4) to validate that the Intent meets the activation requirements. The policy is activated and considered in the enforcement process when the Intent binding function ϕ i extracts the required resources from the Intent. The data selection function ϕ d is represented by the content of the lines 10-19. We use SPARQL's WHERE element (lines 4-19) since its processing corresponds to the variable evaluation function σ (ϕ i , I, ϕ d , D) and returns the evaluated variable bindings. These results are the variable evaluations that match the policy's predicate functions, but they do not define what should be protected by the policy. The projection function π is used to create the quads defined with the variables in q that are protected by the policy from the variable bindings Lets assume that the data in Figure 7 is protected only by the policy in Listing 10, and ex:john submits the Intent from Figure 9 to execute the sp:Create action that requires read operation to be executed before the graph creation. This scenario is valid since each action may require multiple operations to be executed for its completion. The Intent binding predicate function function ϕ i is evaluated against the Intent's graph <http://intent> and separate binding is created for each resource combination that matches all triple patterns of ϕ i (marked bold in Figure 9 ). In our case, vars(ϕ i ) =(?doc, ?ag, ?ip, ?n) and only the variable binding (?doc→ex:john, ?ag→_:ag, ?ip→_:ip, ?n→ ''192.168 .100.0/24'') matches all patterns in ϕ i when evaluated against the Intent graph I. Similarly, the predicate function ϕ d is used to evaluate the variable bindings shown in Table 3 (without the columns ?ag and ?ip) from the guarded data D. The final variable bindings are obtained by joining the two results that have the same value for the variables that are common both in ϕ i and ϕ d , i.e., ?doc and ?n. The user ex:john is the only doctor that has a patient with observations (for the patient ex:bob) and works at the hospital ex:hospital with network IP address ''192.168 .100.0/24'', which is why all of the variable bindings evaluated for ϕ d are in the final result in Table 3 . These bindings contain the resources, literals and blank nodes that match all triple and quad patterns from the policy's WHERE element. The projection quad q is then used to construct the protected data shown in Figure 10 . The first line of the policy in Listing 10 describes that the read operations for the data in Figure 10 will be allowed. Once a policy is entered and saved, the policy management module ( Figure 6 ) aligns it as described in §IV-B1. The ''Parse'' button parses the policy and creates a standalone testing query, as explained in §IV-C1. Additionally, during this action, the policy management module parses the variables from the Intent binding predicate function vars(ϕ i ) and builds the ''Simulate intent'' form that can be used to simulate the policy's protected data for a given Intent variable bindings. The policy management module also shows the results of the data selection actions. If the query in Listing 11 is executed against our sample data, the only Minimal Intent Binding that is extracted is 
3) POLICY's COVERAGE
The transformation algorithm T policy_coverage in Listing 4 produces the query in Listing 12. This query extracts the data shown in Figure 10 from the dataset in Figure 7 . The results of the action ''Coverage per Intent'', obtained by transforming the policy according to Listing 6 and executing the obtained query can be seen in Figure 6 . This query extracts the policy's protected data D (I,p) per its Minimal Intent Bindings. In this way, the data owner can obtain, review and validate the protected data per Intent on a button click.
4) CONFLICT DETECTION
Lets assume that the security requirements from Table 6 should be implemented as policies that protect our sample data from Figure 7 . The policy management module provides comparison of the currently inserted policy with the remaining policies defined in the platform, showing the conflicting Intents together with the conflicting data. The conflict detection process for the policies in Table 6 of the conflict between A2 -P1 is shown in Table 4 . This information enables the data owner to properly resolve the detected conflicts.
C. UNPROTECTED DATA EXTRACTION
A common ambiguity that arises in the authorization platforms is whether the unprotected data should be allowed or denied. Table 5 shows that the policies in Table 6 are not sufficient for complete protection of the sample dataset. This information can prevent exposure of private data (such as the observations ex:o1, ex:o2 and ex:o3) or hiding data that is intended for public good (such as the location of the hospital _:b0). The unprotected data transformation alerts the data owner that additional policies should be created for complete data protection. The policy management module reveals this information on a button click, showing the unprotected data for each atomic operation. Although not shown in the example, there are even more unprotected quads in our example for the INSERT and DELETE operations (43 out of 59 quads).
VI. LDA PLATFORM EVALUATION
The main goal of our work is to build a flexible, maintainable and understandable LDA platform that covers all the design consideration described in §II. The Flexibility of the LDA platform compared to the related work is demonstrated by a set of diverse authorization requirements in Table 6 . The requirements in this table are chosen to cover all flexibility design principles in respect to the use case scenario from §V. This table clearly shows that the LDA platform is the only one that fully covers all these requirements, i.e., all the flexibility design considerations. The policies for every single requirement, written in our policy language, and the data they protect are shown in Appendix.
The context awareness is present in the requirements D1, D2 and EM1, since D1 depends on the requester's agent IP address and on the accessing time, D2 depends only on the accessing time and EM1 is an emergency policy that depends on the data context. Even though the platforms [11] , [13] , [24] provide context aware policies, they only support read operations. Our LDA platform is unique in the support of context awareness for every operation since it provides complete operation coverage for the Linked Data operations. The IntentProvider component enables dynamic context representation through the Intent, while the Enforcement Module protects every operation in the provided contextual environment.
Another flexibility feature that makes our LDA platform distinguishable is the ability to define aggregated data sharing policy which is pointed out by the requirement A3. None of the reviewed authorization platforms supports this feature.
The LDA platform is also superior from maintainability point of view since it is the only one that provides one-to-one policy to requirement specification, conflict detection and protected and unprotected data extraction at the same time.
The extraction of the Minimal Intent Bindings described in §IV-C3 significantly reduces the number of required test cases by removing the ones that do not protect any data. The protected data per Minimal Intent Binding provides a preview of all possible outcomes for a policy, which is a significant information for policy correctness verification. The protected data per Minimal Intent Binding for each of the policies in Table 6 is shown in Appendix.
Apart from the uniqueness of our LDA platform, another contribution of our work is the policy management module. It is a powerful tool that considerably lowers the maintainability effort and time. It provides previewing of the results for versatile policy transformation algorithms on a button click, such as Minimal Intent Binding, conflict detection and extraction of the protected and unprotected data at design time. The results from the policy management module allow anomaly detection, while the flexibility of the proposed policy language enables writing policies that will resolve these security flaws.
The use of the W3C standardized SPARQL query language as a basis of our policy language simplifies the maintenance process by reducing the number of needed policies per security requirement. The large community and materials lower the adoption barrier of our language. There are already tools that enable non IT specialists to write SPARQL queries [45] - [47] , which can be adopted for management of our policies with little effort and adjustments.
As the main goal of the LDA platform is to provide a flexible authorization of the datasets, we relay on the state of the art authentication protocols provided by the Spring library. The Intent provider module unites the authorization and authentication processes. It extracts the evidences provided by the authentication protocol and uses them to compose the Intent used for authorization in the enforcement module. The current implementation of the Intent provider module utilizes a Spring Security authentication provider for the WebID protocol, the most widely used authentication protocol in the Linked Data community. Depending on the use case, different protocol can be employed in order to extract the requester's properties and to secure their intents.
The LDA platform is robust in terms of Query Injection because it does not accept parameterized queries which are commonly used for this type of attacks. In essence, the query injection is an act of replacing the expected parameters with another malicious query, which executes multiple queries per request. The LDA platform is designed to ensure that there is single query per Intent and to modify the query in a way that it can interact with the allowed data only.
Since the data protection depends on the policies, it is crucial to ensure that there is no attack that will alter the configured policies. The current implementation of the LDA platform is conservative in terms of policy administration, and even though it allows policy testing and management, only the person that has control to the LDA platform instance can publish the policies. Another policy administration option is to liberate this process by storing the policies in RDF format and to authorize their maintenance through LDA platform policies. In this scenario, the policy management requirements must have highest priority so that nobody is able to override the policies, i.e., it is impossible to create a policy with a higher priority. This challenge is solved by limiting the maximal priority of the newly added or modified policies to a predefined value.
One of the highest security risks in every platform comes from internal human mistakes. In order to overcome the configuration mistakes and oversights, the policy management module ( Figure 6 ) provides tools for extensive policy correctness testing, as described in §V. These tools enable the data owners to ensure the appropriate protection and to prevent improper data exposure. Considering that the policies are used to construct a temporal dataset with the allowed data without any external influence, we can ensure that the testing results are relevant in production environment. The fact that the temporal dataset contains only the allowed data, the LDA platform prevents obtaining data using multiple probing queries, and therefore, offers implicit data protection, as explained in §IV-B3.
A. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
According to [23] , the enforcement architecture of the LDA platform uses partial data filtering strategy where a temporal dataset is created per request. This strategy has the advantage of providing implicit data protection since the denied data is not considered at all during the Intent processing. However, the evaluations presented in [15] and [16] show that a performance price has to be payed in return to this convenience.
In order to evaluate the performance of the LDA platform, we conducted an experiment of a system configured with the policies from Appendix, data modeled with the ontology shown in Figure 8 and initial guarded data as shown in Figure 7 . The goal of the experiment is to examine the dependency of the processing time on the allowed data size. In order to achieve this goal, we execute 70 evaluation rounds, where each following round increases the size of the allowed data by 10000 quads, representing 2500 resources of type sm:Observation. After each round, we evaluate different operations using 10 warm up cycles and 20 evaluation cycles. The largest evaluated dataset is composed of 700.000 triples. Bigger datasets are not considered since there authorization will require unacceptably long time. In the experiment, we evaluate the following operations:
• Standard LDA authorized query: executes selection of all allowed quads in the current round. The LDA platform is used to authorize the operation using all configured policies for temporal allowed dataset creation.
• Query-centric LDA authorized query: executes selection of all allowed quads in the current round. The LDA platform is used to authorize the operation using only the policies that may affect the query results.
• Hard-coded authorization query: executes selection of all allowed quads in the current round using hard-coded query template for authorization in order to obtain the same results as the previous operations.
• LDA authorized insert and delete: An authorized requester executes insertion and deletion of resources. The LDA platform is used to authorize the intention.
• Hard-coded authorization insert and delete: An authorized requester executes insertion and deletion of resources. Hard-coded rules for the applicable requirements are used to authorize the intention using SPARQL ASK queries. If all query results are positive, the insertion or the deletion is executed. The most common authorization approach used for fine grained data protection is the use of hard-coded rules in the service layer because the developer is able to optimize the performance. Therefore, we consider the hard-coded authorization approach as an optimal protection approach in respect to performance. Figure 11 shows the dependence of the insert/delete operations execution time on the allowed data size. The hard-coded authorization insert/delete operations have almost constant execution time because they execute a separate SPARQL ASK query for each policy before allowing operation execution. Therefore, the performance mainly depends on the number of queries executed, i.e., the number of policies. On the other hand, the LDA authorized operations have linear increase in the execution time since the LDA platform creates a temporal dataset for each intent. The deceleration trend in this case is due to the linear dependence of the dataset creation time on its size. Figure 12 shows that all query authorization operations have linear execution time dependence in respect to the allowed data size. However, the standard LDA authorization query is approximately an order of magnitude slower due to the complexity of the query for temporal dataset creation. Therefore, we optimized this process by using only the relevant policies for the query in the enforcement process. These policies are extracted using variable type inference from the quad patterns present in both the query and the policy. The selected policies are only those that have matching of their projection quad pattern with some of the query's quad patterns, considering the inferred variable types. This optimization results in fivefold performance improvement, which is near to the optimal performance, as shown with query-centric LDA authorized query results.
Even though the hard-coded authorization has superior performance, it is hard for testing and lacks flexibility and maintainability. Moreover, each requirement change requires code modification and additional testing. On the contrary, the LDA platform provides flexible requirement representation, simple maintenance and tools for policy validation and testing. The only price that has to be paid for this convenience is partially sacrificing the performance. However, this price may be acceptable when a complete protection flexibility and maintainability is required.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a complete Linked Data Authorization platform on the top of a flexible policy language designed for Linked Data protection. The LDA platform offers full coverage of the flexibility authorization design principle, while the use of the W3C standardized SPARQL query language as a basis of the policy language increases the understandability and simplifies the maintainability process by reducing the number of needed policies per security requirement. The policy management module supports the maintainability and correctness validation principles in design time, while the enforcement module ensures the implicit data protection.
The LDA platform uses context dependent policies with a broad protection granularity, covering resources, triples, graphs, and datasets. The authorization context is modeled through the Intent, which is dynamically provided through the Intent provider module and contains all necessary requester and environment evidences, together with the intended action and its parameters. The context awareness enables designing emergency policies, while the flexible policy language is unique in its support of policies that can expose aggregated and impersonalized data that will serve the greater good.
The policy management module supports design time validation and significantly reduces the maintenance effort, time and cost. In this process, not only the owners can preview all the data protected by the policy, but they can also get suggestions for the possible test case scenarios that result in non-empty protected data. Moreover, the LDA platform enables conflict detection and resolution by using priorities. This paper also presents how the platform's unprotected data can be previewed in design time, which guides the data owners towards a complete data protection.
The LDA platform is implemented using the the widely accepted Spring Framework and Apache Jena library, and it has acceptable performance in comparison to the optimal hard-coded authorization. Nevertheless, in order to achieve better performance, we focus our future work on defining a suitable query rewriting algorithm for our policy language and introducing caching mechanisms for the temporal datasets.
With all these features in mind, the proposed LDA platform is a step forward towards wider acceptance of the Link Data as a common platform for heterogeneous data representation and interlinking. Furthermore, the policy management module can serve as a useful tool for design time protection validation even for platforms other than the LDA platform.
APPENDIX EXAMPLE POLICIES
Protection requirements listed in Table VI 
